http://www.flov.gu.se/english/research/human-reasoning/
Friday, 7 June, 2013
Time: 10:15 - 12:00
Place: University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Room T116 at the Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, Gamla Hovrätten Olof Wijksgatan 6. Enter through the main entrance. Continue straight on for ten meters (do not take the stairway). Then turn left and continue until the corridor ends. Enter through the glass door, turn left and continue five meters.http://www.flov.gu.se/english/research/human-reasoning/
Hybrid Deduction
Patrick Blackburn
Department of Philosophy and Science Studies
University of Roskilde
In this talk I will discuss why modal deduction is tricky, and why hybrid logic fixes (some of) its problems. Themes I will emphasize include the second-order nature of modal logic, how hybrid logic yields a first-order perspective on frame structure, and how ''non-standard'' hybrid inference rules turn out to be sequent rules ''missing'' from orthodox modal logic. I shall close the talk by discussing recent joint work with Thomas Bolander, Torben Braüner, and Klaus Frovin Jørgensen on what we term Seligman-style tableaux, in honour of classic (but overlooked) work by Jerry Seligman from the 1990s on hybrid deduction.
The talk will be relatively self contained and won't presuppose any particular expertise in modal (let alone hybrid) logic. Indeed, one of my main aims will be to make the intuitions underlying modal and hybrid logic clear to non-specialists.
Friday, 7 June, 2013
Time: 10:15 - 12:00
Place: University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Room T116 at the Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, Gamla Hovrätten Olof Wijksgatan 6. Enter through the main entrance. Continue straight on for ten meters (do not take the stairway). Then turn left and continue until the corridor ends. Enter through the glass door, turn left and continue five meters.http://www.flov.gu.se/english/research/human-reasoning/
Hybrid Deduction
Patrick Blackburn
Department of Philosophy and Science Studies
University of Roskilde
In this talk I will discuss why modal deduction is tricky, and why hybrid logic fixes (some of) its problems. Themes I will emphasize include the second-order nature of modal logic, how hybrid logic yields a first-order perspective on frame structure, and how ''non-standard'' hybrid inference rules turn out to be sequent rules ''missing'' from orthodox modal logic. I shall close the talk by discussing recent joint work with Thomas Bolander, Torben Braüner, and Klaus Frovin Jørgensen on what we term Seligman-style tableaux, in honour of classic (but overlooked) work by Jerry Seligman from the 1990s on hybrid deduction.
The talk will be relatively self contained and won't presuppose any particular expertise in modal (let alone hybrid) logic. Indeed, one of my main aims will be to make the intuitions underlying modal and hybrid logic clear to non-specialists.
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